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Corporate Governance in Microfinance Institutions: Board Composition and the 
Ability to Face Institutional Voids 
By: 
Subrata Chakrabarty and A. Erin Bass 
 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: We utilize institutional theory to examine corporate governance in 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). Many MFIs operate at the bottom of the economic pyramid (BOP), 
which is usually agrarian, impoverished, and plagued with institutional voids. We investigate the link 
between the composition of the boards of MFIs and the ability of the MFIs to face institutional voids to 
ensure organizational viability. 
Research Findings/Insights: We find that MFIs with boards that have more socio-economic expertise 
and female representation are better able to lower the MFI’s costs of operating at the BOP. However, 
this relationship weakens when the effectiveness of agrarian institutions at the BOP is low. When 
agrarian institutions are ineffective, the board of the MFI may have difficulty in helping the MFI reduce 
its costs of operating at the BOP. Agrarian crises arising from ineffective agrarian institutions tend to 
aggravate the various institutional voids present at the BOP, making it harder for the board to guide the 
MFI around the institutional voids. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: We extend institutional theory to understand how boards direct 
and control firms operating at the BOP to face institutional voids. In some cases, a firm can fill an 
institutional void. However, because other institutional voids exist, the board must also help the firm 
develop workarounds to ensure organizational viability. We extend existing literature on board 
composition to highlight how human capital and gender diversity of boards can help improve the 
viability of firms operating at the BOP. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: MFIs with high operating costs may benefit from electing a board with 
socio-economic expertise and female representatives. Governments and policy makers can work toward 
building effective social, economic, and political institutions to help create contexts that are favorable to 
firms (such as MFIs) that often find it difficult to operate at the BOP. 




Markets at the bottom of the economic pyramid (BOP) differ greatly from those of developed countries. 
The BOP represents nearly two-thirds of the world's population, or four billion people that live on less 
than US$1.25 per day (UNDP, 2007). Further, BOP markets tend to be largely agrarian, with the poor 
often surviving on agriculture-related activities (Varman, Skålén, & Belk, 2012). Many social and 
economic issues exist in BOP markets. Social issues include poverty, lack of education and health 
services, and gender inequality (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002; Robinson, 2001). Economic issues include, 
among others, a lack of hard and soft infrastructure, low per capita income, and underdeveloped 
entrepreneurial and business activity. Despite these socio-economic issues, the BOP is recognized for its 
market potential and opportunities for future economic development (World Bank, 2011). 
Many socio-economic issues at the BOP are manifested from institutional voids. Institutional voids can 
be defined as absent or weak institutional arrangements that prevent the effective functioning of 
society (Mair & Martí, 2009). Institutional voids exist in the environment external to a firm and are thus 
often outside the firm's control. These voids create difficulties and threaten organizational viability for 
firms operating at the BOP. Institutional voids prevent firms from engaging in efficient economic 
exchanges and enforcing contracts – both of which can contribute to the costs of operating at the BOP 
(Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005). Firms operating in these contexts must either fill or “work around” the 
institutional voids (Khanna et al., 2005: 64). 
The microfinance industry emerged as a way to fill the institutional void in financial services at the BOP. 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide basic financial services such as loans, savings, etc., to the poor 
who would otherwise not have access to these services (CGAP, 2011). MFIs connect impoverished 
borrowers with financial markets and, in doing so, help address socio-economic issues such as poverty 
and depressed economic activity (Morduch & Haley, 2002; Schreiner, 2002). While MFIs help fill an 
institutional void in the financial sector, they often struggle to work around the numerous other 
institutional voids that persist at the BOP such as “the voids in a country's product markets, its input 
markets, or both” (Khanna et al., 2005: 73). 
One possible source of guidance for firms to work around the numerous institutional voids could be 
effective corporate governance. Corporate governance of a firm operating at the BOP can be viewed as 
“the system, or the set of mechanisms” that internally “direct and control” the firm in the prevalent 
social and economic context (Mersland, 2007: 10). In this study, we ask: can effective corporate 
governance help MFIs work around institutional voids and thereby help lower their costs of operating at 
the BOP? 
We address this question by examining a key facet of corporate governance – board composition. We 
examine board composition and its influence on the costs of operating at the BOP. We suggest that two 
facets of board composition – socio-economic expertise and female representation – are associated 
with the board's ability to lower the MFI's costs of operating at the BOP. We define socio-economic 
expertise as the knowledge of finance/banking services, legal/non-financial services, and 
government/public services that is held by members of the MFI's board. We define female 
representation as the number of females that serve on the MFI's board. We define an MFI's costs of 
operating at the BOP as the overall costs incurred by the MFI to provide and administer loans to 
borrowers at the BOP. 
We contribute to the literature on corporate governance of MFIs in several ways. First, MFIs operate in 
BOP markets rife with institutional voids. Effective corporate governance can guide an MFI to work 
around institutional voids. Second, we emphasize the importance of demographic and human capital 
characteristics of board composition for MFIs. Female representation (demographic characteristic) and 
socio-economic expertise (human capital characteristic) are important for furthering our understanding 
of corporate governance at the BOP. Third, contextual differences exist between the BOP and the more 
developed markets. In sum, our study provides important insight about how corporate governance can 
play a role in guiding firms operating at the BOP to simultaneously address socio-economic issues and 
ensure viable operations. 
Literature Review 
Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Governance 
Research on corporate governance is multi-theoretic. The theories offer varying lenses to understand 
the board's ability to direct and control the firm. The focus of our study is to understand board 
composition and the ability of boards to direct and control MFIs that face institutional voids. Therefore, 
we review some theories of corporate governance in light of whether the context – of institutional voids 
– is considered with regard to the ability of boards to direct and control firms. We highlight these 
different theoretical perspectives in Table 1. 
Management Hegemony. The management hegemony literature argues that “boards are a legal fiction 
dominated by management” (Hendry & Kiel, 2004: 502). Boards often serve to simply “rubber stamp” 
decisions made by the firm's management (Hung, 1998). From this perspective, the role of the board is 
symbolic and is influenced by internal (managerial) pressure (Hung, 1998). As such, managers usurp the 
direction and control of the firm from the board (Mace, 1971). This perspective is concerned with the 
inner workings of the firm rather than how external institutions modify the board's ability to direct and 
control the firm. 
Agency Theory. Agency theory focuses on the contract or governing relationship between the principal 
and the agent. It centers on addressing and resolving (1) the conflicting interests of the principal and the 
agent, (2) information asymmetry, and (3) risk propensity concerns (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency 
theory, as applied to corporate governance, implies that “the major role of the board is to reduce the 
potential divergence of interest between shareholders and management, minimizing agency costs, and 
protecting shareholders' investments” (Hendry & Kiel, 2004: 503). Agency theory provides insight into 
how boards monitor the behavior of managers. However, it does not take into account how the external 
institutional environment can modify the board's ability to direct and control the firm. 
Stakeholder Theory. Stakeholder theory argues that firms are concurrently responsible to multiple 
stakeholders inside and outside the firm. These stakeholders include, among others, employees, 
customers, shareholders, and members of the community (Freeman, 1984). Thus, both boards and the 
firms they serve are influenced by the conflicting interests of these multiple stakeholders. The role of 
boards is to coordinate, and if necessary negotiate, the interests of multiple stakeholders (Hung, 1998). 
From this view, boards should be moral and philosophical guides for the firm (Hung, 1998). Stakeholder 
theory acknowledges that boards and firms are influenced by groups internal and external to the firm. 
However, it does not explicitly take into account the possibility that the absence or ineffectiveness of 
external institutions can strain the ability of boards to direct and control firms. 
Stewardship Theory. Stewardship theory has conventionally argued that management executives 
should be viewed as stewards of the firm (Donaldson, 1990). At the same time, the directors serving on 
a firm's board can be viewed as positively contributing to the stewardship. From this perspective, the 
“role of the board contributes to its overall stewardship of the company”, and the purpose of the board 
is viewed as contributing “knowledge, expertise, and commitment to the firm” so that the firm can 
achieve its objectives (Hendry & Kiel, 2004: 503). Boards can serve to empower managers to take self-
directed action. However, the theory does little to take into account how the absence or ineffectiveness 
of external institutions might hurt the board's ability to facilitate and empower the managers of the 
firm. 
Resource Dependence Theory. Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests that firms operating in the 
same external environment vie for resources from a finite resource pool (Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The overarching perspective of RDT as applied to corporate governance is that 
boards are a mechanism for firms to gain access to resources in the external environment (Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004). RDT provides insight into how boards function to create or maintain a network for firms and 
connect firms to external resources. RDT does make prominent the external environment in terms of 
connecting the firm to external resources. However, the theory does not provide much indication of 
how the absence or ineffectiveness of external institutions could limit a board's ability to garner and 
provide resources for the firm. 
Institutional Theory. Institutional theory focuses on external norms, regulations, and the social 
pressures outside a firm's immediate control that affect the firm's behaviors and outcomes 
(Selznick, 1957). The general notion of institutional theory is that “organizations are constrained by 
social rules and follow taken-for-granted conventions that shape their form and practice” (Hung, 1998: 
107). The role of boards is to identify both institutional deficiencies and institutional pressures and 
suggest ways for firms to navigate the same (Hung, 1998). As such, institutional theory emphasizes that 
the presence vs. absence and the effectiveness vs. ineffectiveness of external institutions be considered 
when assessing the board's ability to direct and control the firm. 
Comparing Theories: Studying Corporate Governance of Firms Operating at the BOP 
Our review of multiple theories suggests that institutional theory allows us to theorize most effectively 
on how the presence versus absence of effective external institutions modifies the ability of boards to 
direct and control firms operating in those contexts. The institutional theory literature addresses at least 
two scenarios. On the one hand, when effective institutions are present, a major concern for 
organizations is to gain legitimacy (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scott & Meyer, 1994; Selznick, 1957). On the 
other hand, when effective institutions are absent, a major concern for organizations is to fill or work 
around the institutional voids (Chakrabarty, 2009; Khanna et al., 2005; Mair & Martí, 2006). The context 
of this study is most relevant to the latter scenario. 
Institutional voids exist when institutions are either inefficient or nonexistent, and they are especially 
prevalent at the BOP (Khanna et al., 2005; Mair & Martí, 2006). Institutional voids may exist in the 
political and social system (e.g., lack of accountability, ineffective legislature, judiciary, or executive, 
government interference, lack of property rights, corruption, incompetence in bureaucracy, problems 
due to social or religious intolerance, lack of independent media, etc.). They can also exist in labor 
markets (poor educational institutions/infrastructure, hard to enforce employment contracts, labor 
practices that are anti-business, etc.) and product markets (e.g., difficult to enforce market contracts, 
lack of reliable sources of product market data, poor logistics and transportation infrastructure, etc.). 
Additionally, the financial system at the BOP may have voids, which prevent those living in poverty from 
accessing financial markets. Regardless of where institutional voids exist, they create difficulties for 
many firms to operate viably. We illustrate the presence of institutional voids in our theoretical 
framework in Figure 1. 
In this study, we extend the sociological stream in institutional theory (Hall & Taylor, 1996) which 
suggests that entities “are seen, not simply as influenced by the wider environment, but as constructed 
in and by it” (Meyer, 2008: 792). In the wider environment, “everywhere, there are models put in place 
by law, ideology, culture, and a variety of organizational constraints and opportunities” (Meyer, 2008: 
793). We argue that these pervasive “models” can shape the way that directors on boards think about 
socio-economic issues, especially when the directors have a background of personal expertise in the 
socio-economic issues plaguing institutional voids. We use this sociological approach to suggest that (i) 
institutional voids are major challenges that boards have to consider as they guide their respective firms 
and (ii) boards that appreciate, understand, and have been immersed in the socio-economic issues at 
the BOP are better able to guide their respective firms in the face of institutional voids. 
The Microfinance Industry 
Microfinance reaches in excess of 152 million people (CGAP, 2011) in more than 110 countries, many of 
which are part of the BOP (MIX Market, 2010). Microfinance provides financial services to the poor, 
which can help alleviate poverty and improve the welfare of the society as a whole (Morduch & 
Haley, 2002; Schreiner, 2002). More information on the varying characteristics of MFIs and their global 
dispersion is presented in Table 2. 
Though MFIs are financial institutions, they are quite different from the usual financial institutions. 
Unlike other financial institutions, MFIs operate with both social and economic goals. That is, in addition 
to providing impoverished borrowers with access to financial services, MFIs also seek to catalyze “social 
change” and address “important social needs in a way that is not dominated by direct financial benefits” 
(Mair & Martí, 2006: 36). Further, differences between MFIs and other financial institutions are made 
apparent in the nature of their relationships with borrowers, depositors, and donors. We illustrate the 
differences in Table 3. 
MFIs' Costs of Operating at the Bottom of the Economic Pyramid 
As illustrated in the theoretical framework in Figure 1, MFIs fill a specific institutional void – the problem 
of “lack of access to finance” faced by impoverished people at the BOP. By filling this void, MFIs help 
increase entrepreneurial activity, productivity, and economic development at the BOP (Morduch & 
Haley, 2002). In addition, microfinance can create positive socio-economic impact – such as poverty 
alleviation (Morduch, 2000; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002), gender equality (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002), and 
improved health and education among those that receive financial services from MFIs (Robinson, 2001). 
Though microfinance is believed to be a promising mechanism contributing to socio-economic 
development, it is plagued with the high costs of operating in BOP markets rife with institutional voids 
(Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013; Morduch, 2000; Shankar, 2007). For MFIs, the “greatest challenge is to lower 
operating costs in order to reduce the cost of service borne by borrowers” (Gonzalez, 2007: 37). Without 
properly controlling costs, the MFI could fail to operate continually in such contexts. Controlling 
operating costs is one way the MFI can be self-sustaining. As such, a “self-sustaining MFI is critical to the 
health of the sector and for it to continue to provide microfinance services to its clients” (MIX 
Market, 2010). If an MFI cannot sustain its operations by efficiently controlling costs, its ability to 
contribute to socio-economic development is hindered. For instance, it would be limited in its ability to 
reach more impoverished borrowers or offer additional services to existing borrowers. 
Much of MFIs' costs arise from the relationships they create and maintain with borrowers. MFIs have 
high expenses associated with administering, monitoring, and recovering loans (Agarwal, 2006; 
Akula, 2008; Shankar, 2007). To cover these expenses, MFIs must charge high interest rates from 
borrowers at the BOP (Fernando, 2006; Helms & Reille, 2004; Morduch, 2000). Because loan monitoring 
and recovery is expensive and interest rates contribute to the viability of the MFI, the microfinance 
industry is not immune to unethical actions. The microfinance industry has come under scrutiny for 
unethical actions by MFI loan agents recovering loans from impoverished borrowers (Chakrabarty & 
Bass, 2014a, b; Karim, 2011). Thus, the costs of operating at the BOP can involve a complex set of 
factors, which includes the administrative cost structure, interest rates, and the costs of creating and 
maintaining relationships between the MFI and its borrowers. See Table 4 for detailed information on 
the concerns associated with the MFIs' costs of operating in BOP markets. 
Corporate Governance of MFIs 
A recent trend in microfinance research is to examine the role of corporate governance in MFIs. 
Corporate governance is a key mechanism to strengthen MFIs' financial and social performance 
(Labie, 2001; Mersland, 2007). Boards, as a mechanism of corporate governance, often guide firms in 
relation to economic issues so that the firm operates in a successful and viable way (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). However, corporate governance in MFIs also encompasses involvement in social issues at 
the BOP. As illustrated in Table 5, MFIs operate in institutional contexts that are less stable, have more 
informal institutions, have ineffective or nonexistent laws and regulations, and where exchanges among 
economic actors are poorly supported. 
In typical financial institutions, the purpose of corporate governance – and specifically boards – is to 
monitor the actions of managers and increase transparency by reducing information asymmetry. Boards 
strive to ensure that managers act in the interests of owners (rather than the managers' self-interests). 
In comparison, the purpose of the boards in MFIs is not only to monitor the actions of managers but also 
to ensure that the organization is achieving social and economic goals simultaneously (Labie, 2001). 
Boards in MFIs strive to ensure that the managers are not neglecting the larger societal interests. 
Hypotheses Development 
Corporate governance is a mechanism within the MFI that can help direct the MFI in tackling 
institutional voids in BOP markets. We develop this idea in the following sections. 
Board Composition and the MFI's Costs of Operating at the BOP 
Corporate governance at the BOP is ineffective when those involved in corporate governance, such as 
boards, are not willing to challenge the status quo at the BOP “due to lack of experience and expertise” 
(Gandy, Shaw, Tebbutt, & Young, 2006: 95). Corporate governance of firms operating at the BOP can be 
different from corporate governance of firms operating in developed markets. For instance, the 
expertise and experience of boards of firms operating at the BOP can differ from those operating in 
developed markets. The boards of firms operating at the BOP need to be aware of the inefficient or 
ineffective institutions in these markets. They also need to successfully direct and control the firm in the 
face of institutional voids. As such, an outcome that is relevant to MFIs is the high cost of operating at 
the BOP (Agarwal,2006; Morduch, 2000; Shankar, 2007). The composition of boards of MFIs can 
potentially help the MFI lower the costs of operating at the BOP in the face of many institutional voids. 
Board composition is especially relevant to research on BOP markets because of the traditional lack of 
diversity in boards (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 2012). We suggest that board composition may 
be an important consideration for MFIs that wish to lower costs of operating at the BOP. 
Socio-Economic Expertise of the Board. Board expertise may help address MFIs' costs of operating at 
the BOP. MFIs that have boards that take an active role in directing the firm (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; 
Hung, 1998) may be better able to achieve social and economic objectives. 
Various forms of expertise represent measures of human capital in board composition. First, boards with 
expertise in finance and banking are more aware of how to use this expertise to benefit the financial 
operations of the MFI. Boards with financial expertise are especially important for debt and earnings 
management. These board members are especially useful in BOP markets in which financial systems are 
either nonexistent or difficult to access (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012). Second, an MFI consisting of a 
board with legal expertise may be at an advantage in terms of regulating or lowering the MFI's costs of 
operating at the BOP. These boards are better able to use their legal acumen to guide MFIs to create 
and maintain equitable relationships with borrowers, depositors, and donors in markets in which the 
legal or regulatory environment is inefficient or nonexistent. 
Third, boards with more expertise in socio-economic and nonfinancial matters would better understand 
the socio-economic issues faced by both the MFIs and their borrowers at the BOP. These boards are 
better able to use their knowledge to provide MFIs with guidelines of how to provide services to 
borrowers effectively at the BOP. Finally, MFIs with boards that have expertise in government and public 
services may employ available government or public services to either aid in relationship building with 
borrowers or reduce inefficiencies in the operation of the MFI itself. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1. An MFI having a board with greater expertise will be better at reducing its costs of 
operating at the BOP. 
Female Directors on MFI Boards. MFIs with more female directors on the board may be better able to 
relate to institutional voids existing at the BOP. Many BOP markets have gender inequality issues 
(Cheston & Kuhn, 2002). Women are often a marginalized segment of society at the BOP (Mair 
et al., 2012). Not surprisingly, women are underrepresented on boards, especially on boards of firms 
operating in BOP markets (Mahadeo et al., 2012). 
Table 6 presents a select sampling of females that serve as directors on boards of MFIs. This table 
highlights the diverse experience these females bring to the boards on which they serve. Expertise in 
gender issues, education, and community development are recurring themes in the biographies of these 
women. Female directors can help the MFI work around institutional voids to achieve social and 
economic objectives. Female directors often have first-hand experience with gender inequality issues 
arising from institutional voids at the BOP. In general, they are good at comprehending the 
characteristics of institutional voids and are committed to helping the MFI achieve its social and 
economic objectives (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). For instance, recent research suggests that more female 
representation on a board could lead to greater corporate social responsibility (Post, Rahman, & 
Rubow, 2011). Female directors' focus on serving borrowers in a socially responsible manner may be 
positively reciprocated by the borrowers. Building a genuinely trusting relationship between the MFI 
and its borrowers can reduce the need for the MFI to frequently monitor and evaluate the borrowers, 
thereby reducing the costs incurred by the MFI. As such, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 2. An MFI having a board with more female representation will be better at reducing its 
costs of operating at the BOP. 
The Moderating Role of the Effectiveness of a Country's Agrarian Institutions 
BOP markets tend to be largely agrarian, with residents depending on agriculture-related activities 
(Varman et al., 2012). The poor in rural areas usually survive by working in agricultural fields, whereas 
their impoverished counterparts in urban areas often survive by trading agricultural produce. A 
country's agrarian institutions, especially those controlled by the government, are important drivers of 
agrarian productivity at the BOP. Agrarian institutions impact economic prosperity in BOP markets by 
building country-wide irrigation systems and controlling tariffs, export subsidies, and market access 
(Anderson, Martin, & Valenzuela, 2006). These institutions are also effective in providing support to the 
agrarian economy through agricultural funding, procurement and disbursal of supplies such as fertilizers, 
seeds, irrigation machinery, and other forms of support (Anderson et al., 2006; World Bank, 2004). 
Further, economic prosperity from agrarian institutions contributes to the development of hard and soft 
infrastructure and social development, such as increased access to public goods. 
High agrarian prosperity is an indicator that the country-level agrarian institutions are effective. For MFIs 
operating at the BOP, the presence of effective agrarian institutions can aid boards in effectively 
directing the organization's economic and social efforts (Gandy et al., 2006). Agrarian prosperity arising 
from effective agrarian institutions helps alleviate the institutional voids present at the BOP, making it 
easier for the board to guide the MFI around the institutional voids. In contrast, ineffectiveness of 
agrarian institutions makes it more difficult for boards to help MFIs reduce their costs of operating at 
the BOP. Agrarian crises arising from ineffective agrarian institutions tend to worsen the institutional 
voids present at the BOP, making it harder for the board to guide the MFI around the institutional voids. 
When the effectiveness of a country's agrarian institutions is low, even a board that has more socio-
economic expertise and female representation may not be able to help the MFI reduce its costs of 
operating at the BOP. This inability to help is because of the numerous transactional difficulties arising 
from agrarian institutional failures. Because the BOP is largely agrarian, there is a contagion or 
downward spiral, whereby agrarian crises worsen the various other institutional voids at the BOP. When 
the various institutional voids at the BOP are worsened, the boards find it more difficult to work around 
the voids. Given the “low level of development in market exchange institutions in poor rural areas,” 
which “leads to very high transaction risks and costs in financial, input, and output markets” (Dorward 
et al., 2004: 613), an agrarian crisis can have catastrophic consequences for MFIs. In agrarian crises, poor 
borrowers are not able to repay at the high interest rates that MFIs typically charge, making it 
challenging for the MFI to recover loans. In the midst of agrarian crises, there is very little that MFI 
boards of directors can do to help the MFI lower its costs of operating at the BOP. Thus, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 3. When the effectiveness of a country's agrarian institutions is high (rather than low), an 
MFI having a board with greater socio-economic expertise will be much more effective at reducing its 
costs of operating at the BOP. 
Hypothesis 4. When the effectiveness of a country's agrarian institutions is high (rather than low), an 
MFI having a board with more female representation will be much more effective at reducing its 
costs of operating at the BOP. 
Methods 
Sample 
Our primary sample consists of MFIs from regions across the world – Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and 
North Africa. Data on MFIs are collected by the MIX (Microfinance Information Exchange), a non-profit 
private organization (MIX Market, 2010). Financial indicator data are directly submitted to the MIX by 
each MFI (or by the affiliated network that files on the MFI's behalf) or are gathered by the MIX from 
public documents published by MFIs (such as annual reports). This financial data is supplemented by 
organizational data voluntarily provided to the MIX by the institution or affiliated network. The MIX 
began collecting organizational data of MFIs in 2008. Because this study focuses on the characteristics of 
the board of directors of MFIs, only MFIs that report organizational data on boards are utilized. For the 
purpose of this study, a dataset is created by merging the MIX data with the World Bank Development 
Indicators data. The sample size is dictated by the extent of overlap among the merged databases and 
the availability of non-missing data for the variables of interest. The merged panel dataset allows a 
sample size of 280 MFIs. 
We arrived at this sample size of 280 MFIs as follows. Over the past few years, MIX has managed to 
assemble basic profile information and financial/operational data of 1,931 MFIs across 116 countries. Of 
these MFIs, 1,321 MFIs were surveyed by MIX in order to gather additional data for the year 2009 (such 
as the characteristics of their boards in 2009). Of these 1,321 MFIs, there are 389 MFIs for which (i) a 
reasonable amount of survey data (such as on board characteristics) and a reasonable amount of 
financial/operational data (such as for firm-level control variables) are available for the year 2009, and 
(ii) a reasonable amount of financial/operational data for the dependent variable is available for the 
year 2010. Of these 389 MFIs, there are: (i) 326 MFIs with non-missing survey data for board-related 
variables for the year 2009, (ii) 372 MFIs with non-missing country-level data in the World Bank 
Development Indicators database needed to measure the moderator “effectiveness of country's 
agrarian institutions” for the year 2009, and (iii) 331 MFIs with non-missing data for the dependent 
variable “costs of operating at the BOP” for the year 2010. In combination, there are 280 MFIs that have 
non-missing data for all the necessary variables of interest (board related variables, country-level 
moderator, and dependent variable). 
Table 7 provides the sample characteristics. The MFIs included in this sample are distributed across 59 
countries, with MFIs from the Latin American region having the largest representation. The World Bank 
defines high-income countries as those with GNP per capita greater than $12,275 (World Bank, 2011). 
None of the MFIs in our sample operate in high-income countries. Forty-four percent of the MFIs in our 
sample are non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The sample means of financial and operational 
data suggest that an average MFI is relatively small in size (in terms of total assets and number of 
employees), with a very strong focus on the microfinance business (more than 90 percent of operations 
is in microfinance). 
Measures for Variables in Hypotheses: Composition of MFI's Board of Directors 
Socio-Economic Expertise in MFI's Board of Directors. The board of directors of MFIs often comprise 
people who have expertise in socio-economic issues. Accordingly, this variable is measured as the 
aggregate number of areas of expertise in the MFI's board of directors. Data are obtained from the MIX 
organizational survey database. MFIs responded to the question: “What are the areas of expertise of 
your institution's board members? (Check all that apply)”. Four areas of expertise were included as 
options, one or more of which could be checked. The areas of expertise were: (i) Financial and Banking, 
(ii) Legal, (iii) Development/Non-financial Services, and (iv) Government/Public Services. The value of 
this variable therefore ranges from an aggregate of 0 to 4 (an MFI whose board has expertise in all the 
areas would get the highest aggregate score of 4). 
Female Representation in MFI's Board of Directors. This is calculated as the ratio of the number of 
female board members to the total number of board members. Data are obtained from the MIX 
organizational survey database. 
Measures for Variables in Hypotheses: Moderator and Outcome 
Effectiveness of Country's Agrarian Institutions. The effectiveness of a country's agrarian institutions is 
measured using the country's crop production index. The crop production index of a country in a given 
year is the agricultural production for that year relative to a base period. It includes all crops except 
fodder crops (World Bank, 2011). The index is obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators 
database, which creates the index using regional and income group aggregates of the United Nation's 
Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO's) production indices (World Bank, 2011). 
MFI's Costs of Operating at the BOP. A substantial portion of the operating costs of MFIs functioning at 
the BOP is the cost of monitoring and maintaining relationships with borrowers. Monitoring of 
borrowers is important for MFIs to assess and manage risk exposure (especially because borrowers 
often lack property that can be pledged as collateral) and to ensure that borrowers make their 
payments on time. This monitoring may involve MFI personnel travelling from village to village at regular 
intervals to meet borrowers to assess their payment capacity. The locations are usually difficult and 
time-consuming to reach due to the tough terrain, geographic dispersion, and lack of public 
infrastructure and transportation, all of which increase the MFI's operational costs. Data for measuring 
this variable are obtained from the MIX financial indicators database. 
The MFI's operational cost per borrower is calculated as the ratio of the annual operating expense to the 
number of active borrowers (MIX Market, 2010). The numerator, operating expense, is the expense 
related to operations, including all personnel, travel, and administrative expenses. The denominator, 
number of active borrowers, is the number of individuals or entities who currently have an outstanding 
loan balance with the MFI or are primarily responsible for repaying any portion of the MFI's gross loan 
portfolio. An individual/entity that has taken multiple loans from an MFI is counted as a single borrower. 
We also carried out analysis with an alternative measure – the MFI's operational cost per loan, 
calculated as the ratio of the annual operating expense to number of loans outstanding. The 
denominator, number of loans outstanding, is the number of loan accounts associated with any 
outstanding loan balance and portion of the loan portfolio that needs repaying. We used this alternative 
measure because we observed that a single borrower could take multiple loans from an MFI. Further, 
the recovery of some loans could potentially be more difficult than others. We found the results of the 
hypotheses tests to very similar irrespective of the measure used, which suggests that our findings are 
robust. 
Measures for Control Variables 
MFI Size. Firm size is included as a control because a larger MFI is likely to have a greater influence 
among its stakeholders and have more opportunities to diversify its loan portfolio. Larger MFIs, 
therefore, might be more effective in mitigating risk. Further, while larger size allows for greater 
economies of scale, it can also result in a lack of focus and management/coordination problems. 
Furthermore, larger firms may have access to more resources (e.g., finance, technology, human capital, 
etc.). Moreover, firm size commonly reflects the amount of output a firm can produce. Firm size is 
measured as the log of total assets, where total assets is reported in dollars. Data are obtained from the 
MIX financial indicators database. 
MFI Operates as NGO. Table 2 enumerated the various forms of legal structures that an MFI can take. 
This variable is coded as 1 if the MFI has a legal status of being an NGO and is coded as 0 if it has a non-
NGO legal status (i.e., among the other forms in Table 2: bank, credit union, NBFI, or rural bank). Data 
are obtained from the MIX databases. 
MFI Loan Loss Rate. Write-offs are a major risk facing MFIs operating at the BOP. An MFI's write-offs are 
a result of non-recovery of uncollectable loans. This variable is measured as [(adjusted write-offs – value 
of loans recovered)/adjusted average gross loan portfolio]. The numerator includes the total amount of 
loans written off during the year. A write-off is an accounting procedure that removes the outstanding 
balance of the loan from the loan portfolio and from the impairment loss allowance when these loans 
are recognized as uncollectable. The denominator is the gross loan portfolio, which is the aggregate of 
all outstanding principals due for all outstanding client loans. It includes current, delinquent, and 
renegotiated loans but does not include loans that have been written off and does not include interest 
receivable. In sum, an MFI's loan loss rate is an indicator of both the extent of risk it has taken and the 
extent of its underperformance in proportion to the risk taken. Data are obtained from the MIX financial 
indicators database. 
Country Mortality Rate. The country mortality rate is measured as the crude death rate for the country, 
or the number of deaths occurring during the year per 1,000 population, estimated at midyear (World 
Bank, 2011). This human factor measure, in contrast to the economic measures of country prosperity, is 
an indicator of human suffering that arises from poverty and poor health infrastructure. This variable is 
included as a control because borrowers from marginalized sections of society – low-end borrowers and 
women borrowers – tend to suffer the most under conditions of high mortality. Data are obtained from 
the World Bank Development Indicators database. 
Country Economic Trade. A country's trading activity is an indicator of economic wealth generation. It is 
often positively related to modern corporate governance practices and negatively related to poverty. It 
is measured as merchandise trade as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank,2011). That 
is, the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of the GDP, all in current US dollars. 
This measure is included as a control because firms in countries with high levels of economic trade are 
more likely to follow modern corporate governance practices, such as having greater expertise and 
greater female representation on the board of directors. Data are obtained from the World Bank 
Development Indicators database. 
Results 
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for our study. Ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions are used to test the hypotheses, the results of which are included in Table 9. For the 
regressions, all the independent variables were standardized (with mean set to zero) to avoid 
multicollinearity problems and to obtain standardized parameter estimates. The independent variables 
were lagged behind the dependent variables by 1 year to indicate the longitudinal direction of the 
effects being tested. Figure 2 provides the interaction plots (the moderator variables are continuous, but 
only lines representing high and low values of the moderators are plotted for ease of visualization). 
The results of our econometric analysis are largely supportive of the hypotheses. First, consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, the association of “socio-economic expertise in MFI board” on the “MFI's costs of 
operating at the BOP” is negative and significant (β = −0.23, p < .01 in model D2 and β = −0.20, p < .01 in 
model D8 of Table 9). Further, consistent with Hypothesis 2, this negative association is significantly 
moderated by the contextual variable “effectiveness of country's agrarian institutions” (β = −0.14, 
p < .05 in model D6 and β = −0.17, p < .01 in model D8 of Table 9). As shown in the interaction plot in 
Figure 2, the association of socio-economic expertise of MFIs' boards on the MFIs' costs of operating in 
the BOP is more strongly negative when effectiveness of the country's agrarian institutions is high 
(simple slope = −61.651, p < .001) rather than low (simple slope = −6.634, p > .10). 
Second, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the association of “female representation in MFI board” on the 
“MFI's costs of operating at the BOP” is negative and significant (β = −0.12, p < .05 in model D3 
and β = −0.12, p < .05 in model D8 of Table 9). Further, consistent with Hypothesis 4, this negative 
association is significantly moderated by the contextual variable “effectiveness of country's agrarian 
institutions” (β = −0.14, p < .05 in model D7 and β = −0.15, p < .05 in model D8 of Table 9). As shown in 
an interaction plot in Figure 2, the association of female representation in MFIs' boards on the MFIs' 
costs of operating in the BOP is more strongly negative when effectiveness of the country's agrarian 
institutions is high (simple slope = −222.584, p < .001) rather than low (simple slope = −43.382, p > .10). 
Overall, we find that (i) appropriate board composition (as indicated by socio-economic expertise and 
female representation) can help lower an MFI's costs of operating at the BOP and (ii) the effectiveness 
of a country's agrarian institutions moderates the association between board composition and the costs 
of operating at the BOP. 
Discussion 
We use institutional theory to highlight the role of institutional voids in the ability of boards to guide 
firms operating at the BOP. Results from our study suggest that an MFI's board composition influences 
the MFI's costs of operating at the BOP. Further, the effectiveness of the country's agrarian institutions 
moderates this influence. 
Contributions and Research Implications 
Our findings lead to several contributions and implications that provide greater understanding of the 
role of corporate governance in MFIs. First, there are both opportunities and challenges for corporate 
governance at the BOP. MFIs have the opportunity to help in the socio-economic development of the 
BOP by providing services to impoverished borrowers. MFIs fill an institutional void in the financial 
system at the BOP by providing impoverished borrowers with access to financial markets. However, 
other institutional voids are present at the BOP. As such, MFIs face challenges as they attempt to work 
around these institutional voids. We suggest that firms should create boards with the ability to guide the 
firm in the face of institutional voids. 
Second, we focus on board composition to understand the corporate governance of MFIs. We suggest 
that boards can be instrumental in helping organizations navigate their way to organizational viability by 
filling or working around institutional voids. Board composition in terms of female representation (a 
demographic characteristic) and socio-economic expertise (a human capital characteristic) is important 
for effective corporate governance at the BOP. For instance, women are generally underrepresented on 
boards in BOP markets (Mahadeo et al., 2012). We suggest that a board with greater female 
representation can positively influence the firm's ability to achieve social and economic objectives (Post 
et al., 2011). Effective board composition helps the MFI to be more aware of the socio-economic issues 
at the BOP and helps the MFI work around institutional voids. 
Third, while the notion of “serving the world's poor, profitably” has been romanticized in recent times 
(Prahalad & Hammond, 2002), we extend the literature by recognizing the difficulties faced by MFIs and 
their boards in pursuing this endeavor. We focus on how effective corporate governance can mitigate 
the MFIs' costs of serving impoverished borrowers. The costs of operating at the BOP are a major 
concern for the microfinance industry. We find that having a board with socio-economic expertise and 
female representation may help lower the costs of operating at the BOP. Such a board can not only help 
address social issues, such as reducing poverty and gender inequality, but also have positive financial 
effects. The board's expertise and commitment to work around institutional voids can help improve the 
MFI's viability and ability to meet the socio-economic needs at the BOP. Hence, corporate governance of 
MFIs is instrumental in tackling institutional voids that plague BOP markets. Effective corporate 
governance can lead to viable MFIs that sustain their operations over the long term and continually 
address socio-economic issues at the BOP. 
Implications for Practice 
From a practitioner perspective, we offer three noteworthy implications, especially for corporate 
governance at the BOP. First, the commitment of MFIs to address social and economic objectives can 
largely be influenced by the MFI's board. Our findings suggest that MFIs that elect boards with expertise 
in addressing social and economic issues can do so with the assurance that it can ultimately help lower 
costs. In doing so, an MFI, under the direction of its board, would be better able to address socio-
economic issues. MFIs should strive to find suitable board members with genuine expertise and 
commitment toward addressing socio-economic issues at the BOP. 
Second, an MFI that finds itself bloated with high operating costs, but without a board that is able to 
help guide the firm to reduce these costs, places both the MFI and its impoverished borrowers at a 
disadvantage. The MFI may find it difficult to operate as a viable entity, thereby compelling its 
borrowers to go to alternate MFIs for services, or perhaps, in more extreme circumstances, give up on 
microfinance altogether. Further, the withdrawal of this MFI from society can have detrimental socio-
economic effects on the context in which it operates. Hence, we advocate that the microfinance 
industry should strive to improve its corporate governance practices. 
Third, governments and policy makers in these markets must be aware of the role that institutional 
effectiveness plays in the viability of businesses and social entrepreneurship initiatives. Effective 
corporate governance can only do so much for MFIs operating in BOP markets. The presence of 
institutional voids at the BOP is real and potentially troublesome for firms, such as MFIs, operating in 
these contexts. Although we demonstrate that effective corporate governance can be influential in 
helping MFIs fill and work around institutional voids, corporate governance is not the magic wand for 
tackling all institutional voids at the BOP. Governments and policy makers can work toward building 
effective institutions, create contexts that allow better corporate governance of firms, and help firms 
navigate the institutional voids at the BOP. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Though we believe our study provides novel insights, we are aware of some limitations that can be 
addressed by future research on the role of corporate governance in social entrepreneurship, corporate 
social responsibility, and sustainability. First, the scope of this study is limited to the influence of board 
composition. Though we believe that our findings provide unique insight to the microfinance industry 
and beyond, future research may benefit from examining other facets of corporate governance such as 
the role of owners and top management teams (Chakrabarty & Whitten, 2011; He, Chakrabarty, & 
Eden, 2014). Second, the costs of operating at the BOP was an appropriate outcome variable in this 
study because of the heightened awareness of such costs in the microfinance industry (Gonzalez, 2007) 
and other industries (Whitten, Chakrabarty, & Wakefield, 2010; Zardkoohi, Bierman, Panina, & 
Chakrabarty, 2011). Nonetheless, future research can certainly investigate other 
outcomes/consequences that may be influenced by the composition of boards of MFIs. Finally, other 
antecedents could play a role, especially those related to corporate social responsibility and 
sustainability (Chakrabarty, 2014; Chakrabarty & Wang,2012, 2013). Future research can consider 
incorporating additional variables of interest when studying MFIs. 
Conclusion 
Board composition is an important mechanism of corporate governance. However, little is known of the 
influence of board composition on organizational viability at the BOP. We focus on corporate 
governance in MFIs and argue that MFIs with boards that have greater commitment to social and 
economic objectives may be better able to reduce costs associated with providing loans to impoverished 
borrowers. Further, we highlight the role of country-level agrarian institutions in moderating the 
relationship between a board's composition and the MFI's costs of operating at the BOP. We contribute 
to the literature on social entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability by 
demonstrating how board composition influences a firm's ability to face institutional voids at the BOP. 
Our study paves the way for greater research on the importance of corporate governance in firms 
















 Figure 1. Theoretical Framework: Institutional Voids in Impoverished Agrarian Regions 
 
 Figure 2. Interaction Plots: Negative Association of MFI Board's Composition on MFI's Costs, with 
Effectiveness of Country's Agrarian Institutions as Moderator 
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